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Trademark: Victoria's Dirty Little Secret: A Revealing
Look at What the Federal Trademark Dilution Act is
Trying to Conceal
L Introduction
"[It] is a cancer which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the
advertising value" of trademarks.' It "is an infection,",2 a "'gradual whittling
away of a ... distinctive trade-mark"' that "destroys the possibility that the
[trademark] can ever be made whole."3 Despite the seriousness of these
charges, the rather vague 4 and controversial doctrine of trademark dilution5
has enjoyed only lukewarm and patchwork support for much of its tortured
history in the United States.6 However, in 1995, Congress surprisingly
1. Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir.
1971).
2. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464,476 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S.
418 (2003).
3. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937
F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Allied Maint. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369
N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (N.Y. 1977)).
4. See Jonathan Mermin, Note, Interpretingthe FederalTrademarkDilutionAct of 1995:
The Logic of the Actual Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REv. 207, 237 (2000) (finding that
the vagueness of the dilution doctrine is inescapable and even questioning whether it is truly
possible to define dilution).
5. Trademark dilution is defined as
[t]he impairment of a trademark's strength or effectiveness caused by the use of
the mark on an unrelated product, usu[ally] blurring the trademark's distinctive
character or tarnishing it with an unsavory association. Trademark dilution may
occur even when the use is not competitive and when it creates no likelihood of
confusion.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (7th ed. 1999). In essence, dilution occurs when "a person or
company uses a mark identical or substantially similar to a pre-existing trademark, triggering
a mental association on the part of the consumer between the two marks, thereby eroding the
strength of the original mark." Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-By-Blurring:A Theory
Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1827, 1828 (2000).
Similarly, scholars such as Frank Schechter have defined dilution as an erosion --"the gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind" of the senior mark
via the use of a similar junior mark. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection,40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 825 (1927).
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act's dilution definition is discussed infra Part II.E.2. For
more information, see generally David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44
VAND. L. REv. 531, 531-38 (1991).

6. See, e.g., James Robert Hughes, The FederalTrademarkDilutionAct of 1995 and the
Evolution of the Dilution Doctrine - Is It Truly a Rational Basis for the Protection of
Trademarks?,1998 DETROIT C. L. REv. 759,764-68 (1998) (describing the courts' interpretive
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codified trademark dilution into federal law by passing the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA).7 Proponents of the FTDA heralded the Act as
"[protecting] famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the
distinctiveness of [trademarks] or tarnish or disparage [them], even in the
absence of a likelihood of confusion."8 Because consumer confusion had
always been the lynchpin of trademark law's protection analysis,9 scholars
such as Kenneth Port expressed fear that dilution claims would sway the
delicate balancing act of trademark law in favor of trademark owners. 10 As
Port warned, the purpose of trademark law has always been "to protect the
consumer from confusion, to protect the goodwill of the trademark right
holder, and to ensure free market access for third party competitors.""
The underlying problems with the FTDA soon became apparent as courts
struggled to apply the Act's vague terms and circular definition of dilution. 2
Among the several interpretative difficulties, federal circuit courts soon split
over the proof requirements for actionable dilution. 13 While the Fourth and
Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals maintained that claimants must show actual
economic injury to their famous marks to prevail under the FTDA, the
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits held that claimants must demonstrate
only a "likelihood of harm."' 4 This "'circus among the circuits" ' came to a
breaking point when the Sixth Circuit addressed the split in V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley.'6 The court, in holding that a showing of

struggle with and lukewarm support for dilution).
7. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000)).
8. B.E. Windows, 937 F. Supp. at 208 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995),
reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030).
9. See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 532.
10. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"Expansion of TrademarkRights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 435-36 (1994) [hereinafter Port,
UnnaturalExpansion].
11. Kenneth L. Port, The CongressionalExpansion ofAmerican TrademarkLaw: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 896 (2000) [hereinafter Port,
CongressionalExpansion].
12. Brian Lerner, Sneaking Through the Back Doorwith PepperidgeFarm: The Monopoly
Advantage of Dilution, 20 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 429, 438 (2000).
13. Paul Edward Kim, Comment, PreventingDilution of the FederalTrademarkDilution
Act: Why the FTDA RequiresActual Economic Harm, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 719 (2001).
14. Id. at 719-20.
15. Id. at 720 (quoting Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, A Circus Among the Circuits: Would the
Truly Famous and Diluted PerformerPlease Stand Up? The Federal TrademarkDilutionAct
and Its Challenges, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 158, 158 (2000)).
16. 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
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"likelihood of harm" was sufficient under the FTDA, 17 set the stage for the
U.S. Supreme Court to finally address the situation in March 2003.
As this note demonstrates, this "circus among the circuits" represents more
than simply an interpretive spat amongst federal courts. Rather, the
controversy goes to the very heart of the dilution doctrine and its
fundamentally flawed foundation. In choosing between requiring claimants
under the FTDA to show merely a "likelihood of harm" or else "actual harm"
outside the FTDA, courts must decide between two evils. On one hand, with
regard to the "likelihood of harm" standard, courts are dangerously close to
rubber-stamping famous trademark owners' dilution claims and thereby
ratifying in-gross property rights 8 for all such marks. 9 On the other hand,
with regard to the "actual harm" standard, courts are quite possibly rendering
the FrDA completely ineffective because of the standard's likely
insurmountable problems of proof.2" As this note demonstrates, the Scylla and
Charybdis scenario embodied in V Secret Catalogue represents the dilution
doctrine's ultimate incompatibility with trademark law. In fact, this note
argues that the dilution theory embodied in the FTDA finds its true origins in
misappropriation, unjust enrichment, and "free-ridership" concerns rather than
in traditional trademark law. 2 ' In short, the FTDA is simply a well-disguised
misappropriation statute for the benefit of famous trademark owners. Part 11
of this note traces the history and development of the dilution doctrine up to
the V Secret Catalogue decision. Part Il provides the facts, procedural
history, reasoning, and analysis of the Sixth Circuit decision. In Part IV, this
17. Id. at 476.
18. In-gross property rights are often described as monopolistic, exclusive, unlimited, fullblown, or at-large. "In gross" itself is defined as "[u]ndivided; still in one large mass."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (7th ed. 1999). As Kathleen McCabe explains, "A propertyright-in-gross is one that is similar to the rights attached to real property. On the other hand,
a quasi-property right in trademark is one with limited protections, based primarily on the
protection of the public from confusion." McCabe, supra note 5, at 1830 n.20.
19. See generally Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
RationalBasisfor Trademark Protection, 58 U. PTT. L. REv 789 (1997) (theorizing that the
FIDA may replace the consumer-protection touchstone of trademark law with a system of
trademark rights in gross).
20. For a discussion of these problems of proof, see Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands Inc., 191
F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogatedby Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418 (2003), which addressed, inter alia, the difficulty with showing diminished revenues, the
flaws of consumer surveys, and the problem of uncompensable injury to the claimant's mark
before the claimant can collect sufficient evidence that dilution had actually occurred. See also
V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 476 (discussing the weaknesses of consumer surveys and the
problem of proving actual harm early on in the dilution process); Nguyen, supranote 15, at 16768 (providing greater detail).
21. See, e.g., Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 558.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003

980

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:977

note analyzes the V Secret Catalogue decision within the context of the
dilution doctrine's weaknesses and misappropriation underpinnings. Part V
scrutinizes the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to determine whether the
Court has satisfactorily recognized the fundamental flaws of the FTDA and
its dilution theory. Finally, Part VI concludes with some final concerns
regarding the current entrenchment of dilution doctrine within trademark law.
II. The History and Development of the Dilution Doctrine Priorto V Secret
Catalogue
Before delving into the origins of the dilution doctrine, it is important to
note that, unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks do not enjoy the
protection of an express constitutional grant.22 Instead, Congress derives its
authority to regulate trademarks from the general language of the Commerce
Clause. 3 Thus, unlike patent or copyright statutes, federal trademark
legislation more frequently receives constitutional analysis and questionable
treatment from federal courts.
A. The Origins of Dilution and Trademark Law
According to Kenneth Port, judicial acceptance of the affirmative
trademark right began in England sometime before 1618.24 Port outlines
trademark law's development as follows: "[tirademark law developed from
unfair competition; unfair competition developed from the tort of fraud and
deceit."2 5 Given such origins, Port contends that the focus of trademark law
has always been on consumer protection, and its justification has always been
tort, not trespass.26 Most scholars agree, recognizing that the touchstone of
U.S. trademark law is, and has always been, consumer confusion and
protecting consumers from the deception caused by similar trademarks.27
Originating from both German and British law, 8 dilution trailed the
development of trademark law in general. According to scholars, the 1924
German Odol case first coined the term "dilution. 29 In Odol, the owners of
a well-known mouthwash sued to stop the manufacturers of steel products
22. Port, CongressionalExpansion, supra note 11, at 897.
23. Id.
24. Port, UnnaturalExpansion, supra note 10, at 464-65.
25. Id. at 465.
26. Id. at 466.
27. E.g., Klieger, supra note 19, at 795.
28. See Jennifer Hemerly, The 'Secret' of Our Success: The Sixth Circuit Interprets the
Proof Requirement Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in V Secret Catalogue v.
Moseley, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 326 (2002).
29. E.g., Klieger, supra note 19, at 805-06 & n.96.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/5

2003]

NOTES

from using their "Odol" trademark. 30 Despite the fact that mouthwash and
steel products are noncompeting goods, the German court concluded that the
owners had a substantial interest in ensuring that their trademark was not
diluted. 3' Heralding what was to come, the court affirmed that "Odol" would
lose its selling power if everyone had the opportunity to use the mark. 32 Just

three short years after this landmark decision, dilution reached American
shores.
B. SchechterBrings Dilution to the United States
In 1927, Frank Schechter, through his seminal article, The Rational Basis
of Trademark Protection, set aside the traditional trademark notion of
consumer confusion and introduced dilution theory to American trademark
law.33 In his article, Schechter espoused four main principles that would
become the bases for dilution theory in the United States:
(1) that the value of the modem trademark lies in its selling power;
(2) that this selling power depends for its psychological hold upon
the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon which it is
used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity; (3) that
such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired by its use
upon either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the degree of
its protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the
efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different
from other marks.34
According to Schechter's primary thesis, the "'real injury' caused by
concurrent use of [trademarks] was not consumer confusion but 'the gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of
the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods. ' ' 35 Schechter
observed that the only rational basis for protecting trademarks was the
preservation of their uniqueness. 6

30. Schechter, supra note 5, at 831.
31. Id. at 832.
32. Id.
33. Schechter, supra note 5.
34. Id. at 830-31.
35. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Schechter, supra note 5, at 825).
36. Schechter, supra note 5, at 831.
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C. Criticism of Schechter
Scholars were swift to criticize Schechter's advancement of the dilution
theory. By dismissing consumer confusion from the equation, Schechter was
not only omitting the very lynchpin of American trademark law, but he was
also foregoing any evidentiary proof requirements beyond that of mark
replication."
Scholars argued that absent any independent proof
requirements, Schechter had proposed "property rights in gross"38 for famous
marks, ensuring them comparable status to patents and copyrights, though
without similar time limits.39 In short, Schechter's dilution theory, in stark
contrast to traditional trademark notions, possessed the potential to provide
trademark owners with virtually exclusive property rights .40 For most critics,
Schechter's dilution theory unacceptably blurred the lines of trademark and
copyright law41 and granted trademark owners monopolies on their marks
when used in any context.4 2
D. State Anti-dilution Statutes
Despite these criticisms, in 1947 Massachusetts became the first state to
adopt an antidilution statute.43 By the time President Clinton signed the
FTDA in 1996, about half of the states had followed suit.' While state courts
assumed that the trademark's loss of selling power and overall economic value
were the injuries addressed by the antidilution statutes,45 the most critical
interpretative question courts faced was how claimants could actually prove
these injuries. 46 From the state courts' fifty-year struggle with this question,
the state antidilution statutes' most significant feature became apparent - the
requirement by all states that claimants prove only a "likelihood of dilution"
rather than "actual dilution" to succeed on their claims.4 7 Moreover, a
majority of state courts refused to accept the statutes' plain assertions that
dilution did not require consumer confusion.48 Given these difficulties in
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456.
See supra note 18 for the definition of this term.
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456.
See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 532.
See, e.g., id. at 535.
See Port, UnnaturalExpansion, supra note 10, at 463.
See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454.
Id.

45. Id. at 456.
46. Id. at 457.
47. Id. at 458; see also Klieger, supra note 19, at 813 (affirming that all antidilution statutes
apply a likelihood-of-dilution standard).
48. Port, UnnaturalExpansion, supra note 10, at 439.
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applying the statutes, along with judicial hostility toward the lack of a
consumer-confusion requirement,49 courts granted relief solely on a state
antidilution basis in only sixteen cases prior to 1996. 50 Moreover, from 1977
to 1994, federal appellate courts granted a solely dilution-based injunction in
only about 2% of the dilution cases that they decided. 5 As the scholar Robert
Klieger contends, dilution claims were "in the vast majority of cases simply
[being] tacked onto traditional infringement claims" and were "generat[ing]
little discussion by the courts."52 Furthermore, even as late as 1994, scholars
continued to point out that actual dilution of trademarks had yet to be
quantitatively proven. 3
E. The FederalTrademark Dilution Act
1. Legislative History
Despite the weak track record of dilution in the United States and its
continuing status as a "'somewhat nebulous concept,' 54 Congress
nevertheless rapidly passed the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution Act. With
the International Trademark Association (INTA) acting as the major driving
force behind the FTDA's passage,5 5 Congress deliberated little on the bill.
Whereas the House conducted only minimal hearings, the Senate conducted
none.5 6 Without addressing the persistent difficulties that had plagued dilution
theory, Congress simply declared the FTDA necessary to bring consistency
and uniformity to the frequently arbitrary and unpredictable patchwork system
of existing state antidilution laws.57 A more unified federal system, Congress
affirmed, was imperative not only to provide dilution claimants with

49. See, e.g., id. at 449 (finding that "courts are still quite hostile to the notion of dilution
even in light of clear legislative mandates to the contrary").
50. See Klieger, supra note 19, at 820; see also Mermin, supra note 4, at 215 (discussing
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy's contention that "'subtlety of the injury caused by dilution'
contributed to judicial reluctance to enforce the state statutes") (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETTION § 24:100 (4th ed. 1997)).
51. See Port, UnnaturalExpansion, supra note 10, at 449.
52. Klieger, supra note 19, at 820-21; see also Hughes, supra note 5, at 804 (finding that,
as late as 1998, dilution was still primarily a "tag on" claim).
53. See Port, UnnaturalExpansion, supra note 10, at 447.
54. McCabe, supra note 5, at 1827 (quoting Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d
621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Mermin, supra note 4, at 207.
55. See K. Keith Facer, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Whittling Away
of State Dilution Statutes, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 863, 897 (2000).
56. See Mermin, supra note 4, at 216.
57. See id. at 2-3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029-30.
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predictable and adequate results,58 but also to stop forum-shopping,59 and to
provide for the enforcement of nationwide injunctions.6 °
Given the INTA's intensive involvement, it was not surprising that
Congress also designed the FTDA to satisfy U.S. obligations abroad,6 1
including greater compliance with the international Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 6' Not only would
the FTDA aid the executive branch in securing greater international protection
for the famous marks of U.S. companies, 63 but Congress believed it would also
help preserve the U.,S.' role-model status in the international law community. 4
Finally, Senator Patrick Leahy also expressed hope that the FTDA would both
protect the good names and investments of U.S. companies and curb the
practice of cybersquatting.6 5
2. The Statutory Language of the FTDA
Having now described the great expectations surrounding the birth of the
FTDA, it is time to introduce the statute itself. In relevant part, the statute
provides: "[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled... to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. ' 66 The FTDA defines
"dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)

58. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030-3 1.
59. See Michelle L. Crawford, UnchartedTerritory: How the United States Patent and
Trademark Office Should Rule on the Federal Dilution Statute, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 953, 968
(2002).
60. See id.
61. See Facer, supra note 55, at 899. But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of
Internationaland Domestic Intellectual PropertyLawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
307, 314 (2000) (contending that TRIPS did not mandate the FTDA); Paul J. Heald,
Trademarks and GeographicalIndications: Exploring the Contoursof the TRIPS Agreement,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 635, 654-55 (1996) (contending that the FTDA was unnecessary
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement).
62. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1215.
63. See Crawford, supra note 59, at 968.
64. See 141 CONG. REc. S19,312 (1995).
65. Id. at S19,313-14 (statement of Sen. Leahy). The issue of cybersquatting is discussed
infra Part IV.D.
66. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
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likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."6 7 Abruptly departing from the
established history of the state antidilution statutes, Congress omitted from the
Act the states' "likelihood of dilution" standard.6 8 By ignoring this traditional
standard and attempting to unify a piecemeal body of state law for the first
time, Congress had certainly broken new ground. The critical question soon
became "why?". Beside the fact that Congress obviously hoped to bring the
United States into greater compliance and uniformity with international law,
such explanation still fails to explain why the United States and the entire
international community were so interested in unifying such a nebulous theory
in the first place.
F. Criticism of the FTDA and Case Law Leading up to V Secret Catalogue
As with Schechter's proposals sixty-eight years before, both criticism and
interpretative problems with regard to the FTDA quickly ensued. First, the
Act seemed to define dilution "in an essentially circular manner. '69 Second,
and more importantly, the FTDA did not specify the requisite proof for a
showing that a junior mark" had in fact "caused dilution."71 Courts that
selected an "actual harm" standard soon drew criticism that they were making
dilution under the FTDA practically incapable of effective proof.7 2 Courts
that chose a less stringent standard, however, faced the accusation that they
were rendering dilution so completely vague under the FTDA as to transform
the theory into "a thinly veiled manifestation of trademark rights in gross."73
In the final analysis, the choice between these undesirable alternatives
depended upon how courts responded to the nagging problem of proving
actual harm from dilution in the absence of consumer confusion.74
67. Id. § 1127 (emphasis added).
68. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449,458 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring"
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 281 (1999)

(summarizing Professor McCarthy's explanation of the difference between dilution (or blurring)
theory and the likelihood-of-confusion test applied in trademark infringement cases: "[tihe
former focuses on a diminishment of the mark's function as a unique identifier of goods or
services; the latter focuses on a mistaken belief that the junior user is in some manner connected
with the senior user's goods or services").
69. Klieger, supra note 19, at 839.
70. "Junior" is defined as "[flower in rank or standing; subordinate." BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 853 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, a junior mark is a trademark that is lower in rank and
subordinate in comparison to another, more established trademark, which is referred to as the
"senior mark." Basically, a senior mark is the first mark and the junior mark is the second mark.
71. Klieger, supra note 19, at 839.
72. See id. at 839.
73. Id. at 817.
74. See also Terry Ahearn, Dilution by Blurring Under the Federal TrademarkDilution
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In Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development,7 5 the Fourth Circuit attempted to resolve this
question by holding that claimants must prove actual economic harm to
succeed on dilution claims.76 At the heart of its analysis, the court extracted
two critical points from the language of the FTDA.77 First, because the FTDA
protects against marks that "cause" dilution, the court reasoned that the statute
grants relief only for actual dilution and not merely for the "likelihood of
dilution" prohibited by the state antidilution statutes.78 Second, because the
FTDA defines dilution as "'the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services,"' the court further observed that
Congress primarily designed the Act to protect marks' selling power rather
than their distinctiveness. 79 This actual loss of selling power, the court
reasoned, constitutes the actual economic harm that can and must be proven
if claimants are to satisfy the FTDA' s literal requirements.8 ° In response to
those attempting to apply a less stringent standard than actual harm, the court
affirmed that upholding dilution claims in the absence of actual harm would
be in essence "creat[ing] property rights in gross, unlimited in time (via
injunction), even in 'famous' trademarks."'" Unwilling to accept such a result,
the court concluded that, even if specific harm may be difficult to prove, it is
explicitly required by the statute.82
While noting the persuasiveness of these arguments, the Second Circuit
ultimately rejected them in Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands,Inc.,83 holding that the
FTDA does not require proof of actual harm.84 In lieu of such proof, the court
Act of 1995: What Is It and How Is It Shown?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 893, 916-17 (2001)
(emphasizing that the highly renowned scholar and professorJ. Thomas McCarthy contends that
courts should apply a mere "likelihood of harm" standard). For a more complete discussion of
Professor McCarthy's comments on the FTDA and this issue in particular, see 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 50, §§ 24:90, :94.
75. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
76. Id. at 461.
77. Id. at 458.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999)); see also id. at 461 (making the causal
connection between actual economic harm and the lessening of a mark's selling power); id. at
464-65 (addressing the difficulties of proving actual dilution but contending that such proof is
possible via loss of revenue, survey evidence, the use of contextual factors, and the use of
consumer surveys).
80. See id. at 459.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 461.
83. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S.
418 (2003).
84. Id. at 223.
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adopted essentially a "likelihood of dilution" standard85 guided by a ten-factor
test.86 Responding to Ringling Brothers, the court first acknowledged that
even a narrow reading of the decision would require proof of actual loss of
revenue.87 Such proof, it concluded, would either be impossible to show, or
"extraordinarily speculative." 8 The court further reasoned that a broad
reading of Ringling Brotherswould require that the "diluting," or junior mark,
already be established in commerce before claimants could seek injunctive
relief.89 This requirement, the court contended, would both subject the
claimants to uncompensable injury and seriously disadvantage the
defendants/junior users.9 ° Turning away from such seemingly unacceptable
results, the court instead embraced its contextual-factors test, simply asserting
that it could conceive of no reason why such factors were inappropriate to
prove dilution."'
The most disturbing conclusion from this circuit split is that both sides may
be correct. In truth, neither proposed solution of the actual harm requirement
seems satisfactory. Courts must either require dilution claimants to prove
actual harm despite the fact that "'no finding of dilution has been supported

85. See id. at 222.
86. See id.at 217-22 (under Nabisco's nonexclusive list of factors for determining dilution,
courts may consider: "[d]istinctiveness," "[slimilarity of the marks," "[piroximity of the
products and likelihood of bridging the gap," "[i]nterrelationship among the distinctiveness of
the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products," "[sihared
consumers and geographic limitations," "[s]ophistication of consumers," "[a]ctual confusion,"
"[a]djectival or referential quality of the junior use," "[h]arm to the junior user and delay by the
senior user," and "[e]ffect of senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark").
87. See id. at 223.
88. Id. at 224. As the court further explained, if famous marks are
being exploited with continually growing success, the senior user might never be
able to show diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that the junior
use diluted the distinctiveness of the senior. Even if diminished revenue could be
shown, it would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the loss
was due to the dilution of the mark.
Id. at 223-24. The court went on to deem consumer surveys (recommended by the Ringling
Bros. Court) as too "expensive, time-consuming and not immune to manipulation." Id. at 224.
89. See id. at 224.
90. See id. The court contended that the claimant will suffer uncompensable injury under
the broader reading because (1) the FTDA cannot be invoked until injury has already taken
place, and (2) the FTDA only provides for injunctive relief and not damages. See id. The court
further contended that defendants/junior users will be disadvantaged because they will not be
able to seek declaratory relief before launching their marks. See id. In other words, "[t]hey will
be obligated to spend the huge sums involved in a product launch without the ability to seek
prior judicial assurance that their mark will not be enjoined." Id.
91. See id.
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by meaningful empirical proof,' ",92 or they must devise some lesser standard
not clearly mandated by the FTDA that may risk "rubber-stamping" claimants'
dilution claims. This quandary leads to the third primary criticism of the
FTDA - that the Act only protects trademarks and their owners. In fact, the
scholar Xuan-Thao Nguyen argues that Congress did not design the FTDA to
benefit the general public but instead the owners of famous trademarks. 93
Given this protective preference, scholars contend that the FTDA suffers from
the same flaws as Schechter's dilution theory because the statute (1) ignores
the consumer-protection touchstone of trademark law and (2) fails to extend
a public benefit equal to the private benefit it provides. 94
In the midst of such criticisms and interpretative problems, the Sixth Circuit
in 2001 confronted the FTDA in the V Secret Cataloguedecision. As will be
addressed more fully in Part VI, the circuit court's struggle with the statute
would finally spur the Supreme Court to action.
III. Statement of the Case: V Secret Catalogue,Inc. v. Moseley
A. The Facts
The facts of this case were uncontested.95 V Secret Catalogue (V Secret)
owns the registered trademark "Victoria's Secret. '96 V Secret licenses the
trademark to its Victoria's Secret stores, which "sell[] a complete line of
women's lingerie, as well as other clothing and accessories." 97

V Secret

operates over 750 stores, and its Victoria's Secret mark has been ranked
among the most famous brands in the apparel industry.98 In 1998, Victor and
Cathy Moseley opened the store "Victor's Secret," which sold, inter alia,
"men's and women's lingerie, adult videos, sex toys, and 'adult novelties. '99
Concerned with the similarity of Victor's Secret to its own mark, V Secret
sent the Moseleys a cease and desist letter."°° As a result, the Moseleys
changed the name of their store to Victor's Little Secret.'' Dissatisfied with
this change, V Secret sued the Moseleys for violation of the FTDA, federal
92. Klieger, supranote 19, at 825 (quoting Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion:The
RationalLimits of TrademarkProtection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 123 (1993)).
93. See Nguyen, supra note 15, at 162.
94. See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 533.
95. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464,466 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S.

418 (2003).
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 466-67.
101. Id. at 467.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/5
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and common law trademark
trademark infringement, unfair competition,
02
1
competition.
unfair
and
infringement
B. ProceduralHistory: The Decision of the Western DistrictCourt of
Kentucky
In V Secret Catalogue,Inc. v. Moseley,103 the district court first addressed
V Secret's federal trademark infringement claims. Examining the determining
factors for a finding of likelihood of confusion,"° the court recognized that V
Secret's mark was strong," 5 that V Secret had not shown any proof of actual
confusion, 0 6 and that V Secret's customers "would have little difficulty in
determining" that the Victor's Little Secret mark was unassociated with the
Victoria's Secret mark.0 7 From these findings, the court reasoned that no
likelihood of confusion arose from the two marks' similarity.' 8 Thus, the
court held that the Moseleys were entitled to summary judgment on V Secret's
federal trademark infringement claims.' 0 9 The court extended this rationale
to dismiss V Secret's state infringement and unfair competition claims as
well.'' 0
Turning next to V Secret's request for injunctive relief under the FTDA, the
court considered the dispositive question of whether the Moseleys' mark
diluted the quality of V Secret's mark. ' 1 The court recognized that "[d] ilution
corrodes a trademark by 'blurring its product identification or by damaging
positive associations that have attached to it."' 2 The court further defined
dilution by tarnishment as "'creat[ing] a negative association with the goods
or services covered by the senior mark.""' 3 Acknowledging the substantial
similarity between the two marks as well as the "risqu6" and "unsavory"
nature of Victor's Little Secret's merchandise, the court held that the Victor's
Little Secret mark was diluting and tarnishing the Victoria's Secret mark.' 4
102. Id.
103. No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000WL 370525 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9,2000) (mem.), rev'd, 537 U.S.
418 (2003).
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *3.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
110. ld.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id. (quoting Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)).
113. Id. (quoting Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 614 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
114. Id. at *5-*6.
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The court granted V Secret summary judgment on its FTDA claim as well as
an injunction to bar the Moseleys from using the Victor's Little Secret
5
mark. "1
C. The Sixth Circuit'sHoldings and Analysis
On appeal, the Moseleys argued that the district court erred in finding that
they had violated the FTDA on the basis that V Secret had failed to prove
actual economic loss." 6 Thus, the primary issue presented to the Sixth Circuit
was whether the FTDA requires proof of actual harm." 7 Given the existing
circuit split on this question," 8 the Sixth Circuit's answer was especially
critical. In adopting an "inference of likely harm" standard, the court
ultimately held that the FTDA does not require actual harm." 9 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment and the
injunction in V Secret's favor. 20
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit first found that V Secret had
satisfied the prima facie elements of a dilution claim.'
The court then
quickly acknowledged the circuit split that had developed with regard to
whether dilution claimants must prove actual injury to their respective
marks.12 2 Recognizing the leading cases of Ringling Brothers and Nabisco,
the court reviewed their reasoning. While recognizing the persuasiveness of
Ringling Brothers, the court ultimately sided with Nabisco, reasoning that its
"inference of likely harm" test more closely mimicked the FTDA's language
and Congress' intent by providing a broad remedy for dilution 2 3 and by
allowing a remedy prior to the plaintiff suffering actual harm. 124 The court
reasoned that refusing to grant a remedy prior to actual economic harm would
be "extremely difficult, as no such harm would have taken place when the
115. Id. at *6.
116. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464,466 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S.
418 (2003).
117. See id. at 472.
118. See supra Part H.F., for a discussion of how courts such as the Second Circuit have held
that no actual harm is required under the FTDA, whereas courts such as the Fourth Circuit have
held to the contrary.
119. V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 476.
120. Id. at 477.
121. Id. at470-71.
122. Id. at 471.
123. Id. at 475. The court affirmed that Congress intended to guarantee claimants a
nationwide remedy for their dilution claims. Id.
124. Id. at 475-76. The court cited to the following phrase in the Congressional Record "'which if allowed to spread"' - as indicative of Congress' intent to allow a dilution remedy
before actual economic harm has occurred. Id. at 476.
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remedy became available, and proof would be limited to the sorts of consumer
surveys that the Fourth Circuit itself admits are unwieldy at best."'' 25 In sum,
the court concluded that a requirement of actual harm would simply make
successful FFDA claims unreasonably difficult and thus 26thwart Congress'
intent to provide claimants with a broad dilution remedy.1
Next, the court addressed how to define dilution in the absence of actual
proof. Adopting Nabisco's ten-factor test,'27 the court first recognized that
Victoria's Secret is a very distinctive mark, worthy of a high degree of
protection. 18 The court further recognized the high degree of similarity
between it and the Victor's Little Secret mark.' 29 Finding that "consumers
who hear the name 'Victor's Little Secret' are likely automatically to think of
the more famous store and link it to the Moseleys' adult-toy, gag gift, and
lingerie shop," the court ultimately concluded that "[tihis ... is a classic
instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria's Secret name with
sex toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a
single, unauthorized establishment)."' 3
IV. Analysis of V Secret Catalogue
A. Where's the Harm - Was V Secret's Trademark Really Blurred?
The initial question compelled by V Secret Catalogue'sholding of blurring
by dilution is whether it provides V Secret with a truly needed remedy. In
other words, can the decision survive the contention by some scholars that the
FTDA provides remedies in the absence of actual wrongs?' 3 ' Indeed, legal
commentators often quip that, with the possible exception of tarnishment,
125. Id. at 476. For further discussion of the absurdity of the position of refusing to grant
remedy prior to actual economic harm, see also Daniel H. Lee, Remedying Past and Future
Harm: ReconcilingConflicting CircuitCourtDecisions UndertheFederalTrademarkDilution
Act, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 689 (2002), which contends that "disastrous results" may occur if
plaintiffs cannot invoke the FTDA until economic harm has actually occurred. Id. at 715.
126. V Secret Catalogue,259 F.3d at 476; see also Jeffrey Enright, Note, Slow Death of a
Salesman: The Watering Down ofDilution Viability by DemandingProofof Actual Economic
Loss, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 950-59 (2002) (attacking the actual economic harm
requirement "because it holds [claimants] to an impossible level of proof, subjects [claimants]
to uncompensable injury, contravenes the [FTDA's] plain meaning .... and eviscerates [the
FTDA's designed purpose] to protect against the loss of distinctiveness" rather than revenue or
even actual economic harm).
127. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
128. V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 476.
129. Id. at 476-77.
130. Id. at477.
131. See Kim, supra note 13, at 759.
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imitation is "the 'sincerest form of flattery."' ' 32 Moreover, just as everyone
knows that Porsche is a famous brand of expensive car, 33 so, too, everyone
knows that Victoria's Secret is a famous brand for moderately-expensive
women's lingerie. After all, Victoria's Secret is among the most famous
brands in all of women's apparel, much less lingerie.'34 ThuS, while a
customer of Victor's Little Secret may very well be reminded of the much
more famous and established V Secret lingerie chain, it is unclear how such
a reminder lessens the capacity of the Victoria's Secret mark to identify and
distinguish V Secret's merchandise. Not only does V Secret have an
enormous head start and overall advantage over the Moseleys' small, single
store, but the company also continues to produce quality merchandise and to
aggressively advertise and market its distinctive trademark." 5 Therefore, it is
difficult to fathom how one store in a single strip mall using the name Victor's
Little Secret could inflict irreparable harm upon this industry giant. Indeed,
the famous trademark Tiffany continues to withstand the onslaught of
numerous unrelated Tiffany establishments, "none of which threatens to
eclipse the fame of Tiffany & Co.' 36
In attempting to counter this critique of dilution theory, Schechter provides
the following hypothetical: "'[i]f you take Rolls Royce - for instance, if you
allow Rolls Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce
pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 years you will not have the Rolls Royce
mark any more."" 37 By analogy, doomsayers could argue that, if you allow
one Victor's Little Secret store, and then another one, and then perhaps a
Victoria's Secret theater, and so on - in a few years V Secret would lose the
effectiveness of the Victoria's Secret mark.
While such prophecies of doom might be convincing on their face, scholar
David Welkowitz contends that they all suffer from the same fundamental
flaws.138 First, as suggested above, as long as trademark owners like V Secret
make reasonable advertising and quality-control efforts, no dilution should

132. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999).
133. See Port, CongressionalExpansion, supra note 11, at 902.
134. See V Secret Catalogue,259 F.3d at 466.
135. See Welkowitz, supranote 5,at 543-44 (contending that, given Kodak's enormous head
start over the defendant, Kodak's trademark will not be diluted so long as Kodak continues to
advertise and make useful products).
136. Id. at 539.
137. Id. (quoting HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong. 15 (1932))
(statement of Frank I. Schechter).
138. See generally id. at 538-46 (providing a full discussion of the flaws of the dilution
doctrine).
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After all, protected trademarks under the FTDA must be famous to
enjoy FTDA protection in the first place. 40 In short, as long as V Secret keeps
the Victoria's Secret mark within the public spotlight, it cannot be whittled
away as Schechter would contend. Second, Schechter's hypothetical
erroneously assumes that strong marks can become weak ones in a transitional
process devoid of any consumer confusion. 4 ' As Welkowitz argues, it is
more likely that the public will become confused by the existence of two
similar marks at some point during the weakening of the senior mark.' 4 2 It is
highly "unlikely that someone could use a well-known mark and become well
known without causing public confusion.""' Thus, even if Victor's Little
Secret stores were to multiply in number and become increasingly well
known, at some point, the similarity between the two marks would inevitably
confuse consumers. This confusion, of course, would permit V Secret to bring
a trademark infringement claim against the Moseleys, thus rendering their
dilution claim superfluous.
B. The Dilution by Blurring Theory of V Secret Catalogue Is Overly Broad
and Unnecessary
As the last point demonstrates, the protection afforded by the FTDA is
almost entirely superfluous to existing trademark protection. Indeed, not only
does current trademark law provide generous protection for nearly all
legitimate injuries to trademarks,'" but also the FTDA "grants protection to
those least in need of it - owners of 'distinctive' trademarks"'' 45 such as V
Secret. If it is in fact the case that the FTDA provides no new rights in famous
marks, 146 then one must ask two pressing questions: (1) Why did Schechter
believe the need for dilution was so pressing?; and (2) Why did Congress and
President Clinton so overwhelmingly support and pass the FTDA?
The key to the first question is found by comparing modem trademark law
to the trademark law in effect during Schechter's lifetime. Times have most
definitely changed since Schechter's 1927 article, and American trademark
law has certainly evolved alongside them. As Jerre Swan relates, Schechter's
fear that a famous mark's selling power might be blurred by the use of the
mark on noncompeting goods is no longer a valid justification for the dilution
139. See id. at 544.

140. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 540.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 533.
Id.
See Kleger, supra note 19, at 846.
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doctrine. 14 7 First, as Swann contends, today's law of unfair competition
almost always protects owners of famous trademarks from such use by
noncompetitors. 48 Second, according to Klieger, both the courts and
Congress eliminated trademark law's direct competition requirement within
twenty years of Schechter' s proposals, thus protecting trademark owners from
noncompetitors.' 4 9 Given these advancements in trademark law and the law
of unfair competition, Klieger contends that Schechter indeed acted
prematurely in forsaking the consumer-protection touchstone of trademark
law. 5 ° Few today, he affirms, can criticize the effectiveness of modem
trademark law in protecting the vital functions of trademarks.' 5 ' Thus,
whereas a mark such as the Victoria's Secret mark may in fact have been
vulnerable to dilution in 1927, this would almost certainly no longer be the
case under existing trademark law or the current image of Victoria's Secret,
52
for that matter. 1
If the Victoria's Secret mark is no longer vulnerable to dilution, then the
next question becomes critical. Indeed, why would Congress go to the trouble
of passing major legislation for already-protected trademarks? If not dilution,
what is the FTDA really all about?
C. The Disguised FederalTrademark MisappropriationAct
As established previously, the FTDA is anomalous in trademark law in that
it does not protect the general public.'5 3 Eschewing the consumer confusion
requirement, the statute only protects trademark owners and their famous
marks and provides no direct public benefit. Thus, to determine what the
FTDA is really all about, it is necessary to identify what exactly the owners
of famous trademarks gain from FTDA protection. Most obviously, the
FTDA relieves these owners from having to provide sufficient evidence of

147. See Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefinedfor the Year 2000, 37 Hous. L. REv. 729,
747 (2000).
148. See id.
149. See Klieger, supra note 19, at 808.
150. See id. at 807.
151. See id. at 808; see also Mermin, supra note 4, at212-13 (discussing the 1946 Lanham
Act's elimination of the "same descriptive properties" requirement and contending that this
elimination allayed much of Schechter's concerns because it allowed trademark owners to sue
for infringement against uses on noncompeting goods).
152. See William Marroletti, Note, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Needfor a Clear
InternationalStandardto Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 659, 691
(1999) (contending that the dilution doctrine is difficult to apply because it is based on outdated
concepts irrelevant to the modem marketplace and modern consumers).
153. See supra Part L.F.
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consumer confusion.' 54 Such relief, of course, will somewhat lighten the
plaintiff's burden of proof in trademark cases. However, something more
seems to be afoot. As Klieger relates, at least two of the FTDA supporters
(representing Campbell Soup Company and Warner Brothers) who testified
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property
were
visibly enticed by the promise of corporate windfall, treating
dilution doctrine at least implicitly as if it were intended to create
trademark rights in gross: "The basic principle is that the
trademark owner who has spent the time and investment needed to
create and maintain the property, should be the sole determinant of
'
how that property is to be used in a commercial manner."155
Thus, far from expressing concern over the "whittling away" of famous marks
or the lessening of their capacity to identify and distinguish their respective
owners' goods and services, these FTDA supporters seemed much more
concerned about preventing junior users from unfairly "free riding"' 56 on
senior users' substantial investments in their famous marks. Senator Patrick
Leahy explicitly noted this concern when he expressed his desire for the Act
to protect the investments of such U.S. companies as IBM and Ben &
Jerry' s.57 The testimony of the Assistant General Counsel for Campbell Soup
Company is particularly revealing of this freeridership sentiment: "' [p]iggybacking on the reputation of a famous trademark will, consequently, gradually
erode the goodwill attached to the trademark, but it will also give 1the
junior
58
user an unfair, long lasting and valuable competitive advantage."
As the above testimony suggests, Congress may very well have designed
the FTDA as a potential "recipe for senior entrenchment" and the
monopolistic stifling of competition.' 59 Courts may be furthering this design,
Welkowitz contends, because they, too, "are responding more to the problem
of a second user taking a 'free ride' on the well-known mark than to the
gradual 'whittling away' concept of dilution. In other words, in practice
154. Klieger, supra note 19, at 847.
155. Id. at 838-39 (quoting Madrid ProtocolImplementation Act and FederalTrademark
Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1270 and 1295 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
IntellectualProperty,House Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 158, 165 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Nils Victor Montan).
156. A "free rider" is defined as "[o]ne who obtains an economic benefit at another's
expense without contributing to it." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 676 (7th ed. 1999).
157. 141 CONG. REc. S19,312 (1995).
158. Crawford, supra note 59, at 1003 (quoting Hearing,supra note 155, at 94 (statement
of James K. Baughman, Assistant General Counsel, Campbell Soup Co.)).
159. See Kim, supra note 13, at 757-58.
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dilutionmay be a tort of misappropriationor unjust enrichment."'' 60 It is now
clear why dilution has fit so awkwardly within the law of trademark and why
the FTDA has been so impossible for the courts to apply consistently - "[the]
central problem with the dilution doctrine [is] that its roots are really in the
doctrine of misappropriation rather than trademark."' 61 In short, dilution's
justification really lies in protecting trademarks from being misappropriated
162
rather than in Schechter's fear of trademarks being "whittled away."
D. Just How Poorly DisguisedIs the Federal Trademark Misappropriation
Act?
Given its monopolistic, senior-entrenchment tendencies,
the
misappropriation doctrine has not remained hidden for long within the FTDA.
As commentators quickly noted, the FTDA has drawn the battlelines between
big and small businesses; 6 in other words, between the "haves" and "havenots."I'' Critics have expressed the fear that the FTDA, if improperly applied,
160. Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 545-46 (emphasis added). For a further discussion, see
Swann, supra note 147, at 771-72, explaining that
[m]any courts react viscerally to efforts to partake of the 'magic' of another's
mark, to capture 'its ready-made public acceptance.' Dilution has many of its
'roots in the idea that investments in the future of a brand that make it appealing
to consumers should not be undermined by others who seek a free ride, whether
on the work that produced the goodwill underlying the mark or on the mark itself.'
Many courts intuitively reject conduct that affords a 'junior user an apparently
unearned advantage, for which the senior user receives nothing,' particularly
where there is no 'countervailing public policy' favoring, e.g., the use of SONY
by another on bleach. Whether or not free riding should alone command a remedy,
evidence of misappropriation ... reinforces the likelihood of association. The
existence of actual misappropriation... virtually assures some impingement on
brand clarity.
Id. (quoting Note, Dilution:TrademarkInfringement or Will-O'-the-Wisp?, 77 HARv. L. REv.
520, 526 (1964); Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 766
(1990); Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 585, respectively) (citations omitted).
161. Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 558 (citation omitted). "Misappropriation" is defined as
"[t]he application of another's property or money dishonestly to one's own use." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1013 (7th ed. 1999). Misappropriation is also described as a doctrine that
"involves unfair competition beyond the conventional framework of 'passing off' by creating
a common-law property right against 'misappropriation' of commercial worth." Enright, supra
note 126, at 957. Enright goes on to contend that academia has not favored the
misappropriation doctrine and to accuse the Ringling Brothers decision of also falling prey to
the very doctrine it claimed to be avoiding. Id.
162. See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 584.
163. See Lee, supra note 125, at 707.
164. See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 585 (contending that dilution protection constitutes a
"bonanza for the 'haves' but gives the rest of society nothing).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/5

2003]

NOTES

could become a strong anticompetitive weapon that will permit the rogue
dilution theory to run roughshod over small companies. 165 As Professor Mark
Lemley notes, the FTDA supports those trademark owners less motivated by
dilution concerns than by the desire to protect their marks from competition
and to "'keep up with the Cokes." ' 166 In essence, he contends that big
companies have begun using the F1DA as a back door67 to acquire "de facto
patent and copyright protection" to stifle competition. 1
While some scholars have questioned the FTDA's big-business,
misappropriation roots, its initial supporters seem to applaud them. The
House Report itself states that the dilution doctrine recognizes the substantial
investments of trademark owners and the commercial value of their marks,
"protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own
gain."' 168 Furthermore, some of dilution theory's strongest scholarly support
expresses misappropriation elements, including notions of unfairness and
property taking,' 69 exploitation by free riders, 170 and express charges of
misappropriation,'' to list but a few.'
Moreover, given that Congress
intended the FTDA to secure U.S. companies greater protection both at home
and abroad,'73 it should not come as any surprise that such big companies as
Warner Brothers, Campbell Soup, IBM, and Ben & Jerry's 174 were either
directly involved or explicitly mentioned in the FIDA's legislative history.
Most certainly, these industry giants saw through the disguise and recognized
what they had to gain from the FTDA's passage.
The FTDA's disguise has become even more transparent as courts have
applied the Act to its full extent. Consistent with Senator Leahy's expressed
desire that courts apply the FTDA to stop cybersquatters, 75 courts have even
165. See McCabe, supra note 5, at 1830.
166. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE. L.J. 1687, 1705 (1999).
167. Id.
168. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
169. Mathias Strasser, The RationalBasis of TrademarkProtectionRevisited: Putting the
DilutionDoctrineinto Context, 10 FORDHAMINTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375,412 (2000).
170. Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a Reconciliationwith the Lanham
Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 166 (1995) (emphasis added).
171. Swann, supra note 147, at 760 (emphasis added).
172. See also Mermin, supra note 4, at 209 (stating that FTDA supporters believe that
trademark owners have a right to stop replication of their marks similar to a landowner's right
to enjoin trespass). Note supraPart I.A., contending that traditional trademark law is grounded
in tort, not trespass.
173. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1031.
174. See supra Part IV.C.
175. See supra Part II.E.1; see also Melindo S. Giftos, Reinventing a Sensible View of
Trademark Law in the Information Age, 2 INTELL. PROP. 2, *3* of 24 (2000) (defining
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begun to resolve domain name disputes using the FTDA. 7 6 As many scholars
contend, the FTDA's policing of cybersquatting has had nothing to do with
the "whittling away" of marks and everything to do with the misappropriation
or freeridership concerns of big companies. According to Melinda Giftos, the
cybersquatting context has been particularly illustrative of the dilution
doctrine's resemblance to trademark rights in-gross.'7 7 As she explains, large
companies began suing smaller companies under the FTDA to recover domain
names that allegedly contained their trademarks. 178 Sadly, she affirms, these
dilution claims have been often without merit - the large companies have
raised them merely as leverage against their smaller competitors, who simply
cannot afford to litigate over the name and so they must concede without a
fight.179 Thus, as the cybersquatting context makes clear, large companies
have been wielding the FTDA as an anticompetitive180weapon designed to
prevent freeridership and misappropriation in general.
Other contexts revealing of the FTDA' s true origins are dilution by parody
and dilution by tarnishment.18 ' As Welkowitz argues, these misnomers
ultimately remedy freeridership and misappropriation concerns but not
dilution. 182 For example, in lieu of protecting senior users from the "whittling
away" of their marks, these dilution theories focus on the "unearned
advantage" that junior users gain from parodying or tarnishing the marks of
the uncompensated senior users.'83 Furthermore, with regard to dilution by
parody, Welkowitz explains that a successful parody actually depends on the
continuing success of its target 84 and often tends to increase public
identification of claimants' marks with the claimants. 185 Thus, because
parodists obviously have a self-interest in their targets remaining well-known
"cybersquatters" as those who "register domain names for the express purpose of later selling
the domain names to someone else for a profit").
176. See Natalia Ramirez, Will the Anticybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct Create
More Problems Than It Solves?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 395, 404-05 (2002).
177. See Giftos, supra note 175, at *8* of 24.
178. See id.
179. See id. at *8*-*9* of 24.
180. See Marroletti, supra note 152, at 667.
181. See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 550 (discussing dilution by parody and tarnishment);
see also Hughes, supra note 52, at 775 (defining tarnishment as "a harm to 'the positive,
quality-connoting associations the holder [of a trademark] has labored to create through
advertising and promotion' .... Put simply, it represents a harm done to the business reputation
and goodwill of a trademark holder as symbolized by the trademark.") (quoting Staffin, supra
note 170, at 131) (first alteration in original).
182. See Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 585.
183. See id. at 585-86.
184. Id. at 556.
185. Id. at 555-56.
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and undiluted,'8 6 Welkowitz contends that dilution cannot logically be the real
harm that dilution by parody remedies.' 8 7 Rather, Welkowitz concludes that
dilution by parody and tarnishment claims compensate senior users for the
freeridership of junior users who tarnish and parody - in other words,
' Indeed,
misappropriate - the senior marks at the senior users' expense. 88
companies such as V Secret who bring dilution by tarnishment claims are
primarily interested in being compensated for the unearned advantage that
such small businesses as Victor's Little Secret receive from "freeriding" on
' In sum, the cases dealing with
the hard-earned popularity of their marks. 89
dilution by parody and tarnishment simply reflect once again the central
problem with the FTDA and dilution theory in general - they originate not
from the doctrine of trademark but rather from the doctrine of
misappropriation. 90
E. Taking Another Look at V Secret Catalogue, This Time Through the
MisappropriationLens
In re-analyzing V Secret Catalogue in light of the above discussion, it
becomes apparent that the battlelines are drawn between the industry giant V
Secret and the Moseleys' single Victor's Little Secret store. V Secret most
likely did not sue the Moseleys because it feared that consumers would soon
fail to associate the next televised "Victoria's Secret" fashion show with the
company, but rather because (1) V Secret was not being compensated for the
inevitable advantage that the Moseleys received from the similarity between
the two marks, and (2) it wanted to send a strong message to present and
future competitors to stay off of its turf. The only thing, of course, standing
in the way of this desired message was the U.S. Supreme Court.
When the Supreme Court interjected itself into the paths of Scylla and
Charybdis by granting certiorari in April 2002,'9' it was obviously undertaking
no easy task. If the Court gave V Secret its way, then it could very well be
arming V Secret and other large companies with yet another anticompetitive
weapon to place in their marketing strategy arsenals'9 2 - a super trademark.1 93
Small businesses might be deterred from ever entering into the marketplace

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
See id. at 585. See generally id. at 550-58 for a more complete explanation.
See id. at 558.
Id.
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 535 U.S. 985 (2002).
Welkowitz, supra note 5, at 584.
See Port, UnnaturalExpansion, supra note 10, at 485.
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because of the threat of lawsuits.194 Furthermore, established small businesses
such as Victor's Little Secret, who use their marks in an illustrative manner,
could find themselves especially vulnerable to the possibility of suit and often
forced to give up their marks at great individual expense. 195 On the other
hand, if the Supreme Court sided with the Moseleys and required actual harm,
then the Court would essentially be declaring the FTDA a dead letter. Either
way, it seemed, Congress would ultimately have to respond, and dilution
theory's dirty little secret would have to be revealed.
V. Discussionof the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision
Disappointingly, the Supreme Court's highly-anticipated decision in
Moseley v. VSecret Catalogue'96 does little more than preserve the confusion.
Initially, at least, the Court affirmatively holds that the FTDA "unambiguously
97
requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution."'
In rejecting the lower courts' decisions, the Court reasons that (1) the Act
itself states "causesdilution"'9 8 and (2) the Act defines dilution by contrasting
the phrase "'lessening of the capacity of a famous mark"' with the phrase
"'likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."" 99 For this contrast 2to
0
mean anything, the Court concludes, "actual dilution must be established. 1
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court fails to satisfactorily address the
FTDA' s application difficulties. Rejecting RinglingBrothers' contention that
dilution claimants must prove actual loss of sales or profits,20 ' the Court
nonetheless affirmed that mere proof of mental association between the marks
is insufficient to establish dilution, at least where the marks are not
identical. 0 2 While acknowledging the inherent unreliability and expense of
consumer surveys, the Court reasoned that such evidence will not be necessary
as long as dilution can be reliably proven through circumstantial evidence.2 3
Rather than defining what this "circumstantial evidence" might entail,
however, the Court simply stated that an "obvious case" of such circumstantial
evidence is one in which the marks are identical. 2' 4 Then, without offering
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id.
See id.
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
Id. at 433.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000)).
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 434.
Id.
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any solution to the FTDA's proof difficulties, the majority opinion abruptly
ended by acknowledging the Act's proof difficulties but asserting such
difficulties do not constitute "an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof
of an essential element" of a FTDA violation. 0 5
Complicating matters even further, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
appears to provide dilution claimants with some "wiggle room" to try and
escape the actual-dilution requirement of the majority. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy contended that some dilution claimants may still be able to prove
dilution before it ever occurs by simply asserting that the potential selling
power of their respective marks will become diminished by the junior mark.2 °6
Justice Kennedy reasoned that trademark owners should not have to wait until
27
their marks have been actually damaged before bringing dilution claims. 1
Throughout his concurrence, Justice Kennedy did not attempt to explain how
his "potential dilution" standard is distinguishable from the "likelihood of
dilution" standard clearly rejected by the majority.
In analyzing the Supreme Court decision as a whole, it is tempting to
conclude that the Court simply punted this one back to Congress. Indeed,
while the Court clearly held that dilution claimants must prove actual dilution,
it provided no assistance in determining how this can be accomplished in the
absence of identical marks. Rather than attempting to flesh out the great,
undefined middle of the dilution-claim spectrum, the Court simply identified
one end of the spectrum - identical marks - as being sufficient proof of
dilution and the other end - proof of mental association alone - as being
insufficient proof. Furthermore, the Court failed to explain what constitutes
sufficient "circumstantial evidence" in the absence of consumer surveys or
proof of actual loss. Finally, Justice Kennedy's separate opinion confusingly
reads more like a dissent than it does a concurrence. Given these difficulties
with the opinion, the critical question becomes how lower courts will now
interpret and apply it. If the courts ultimately ignore Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, then the FTDA will most likely become a dead letter as
predicted. If, however, some or all of the courts fully embrace his
concurrence, then the circus among the circuits and the fear of rubberstamping
dilution claims may very well re-emerge. At some point, of course, it is hoped
that Congress will evaluate the FTDA' s effectiveness, realize dilution theory's
misappropriation roots and fundamentally flawed foundation, and consider
repealing the Act. Until that time, however, this note concludes that the

205. Id,
206. Id. at 435-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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poorly disguised misappropriation Act will continue to wreak havoc in the
trademark realm.
VI. Conclusion
One possible critique to this note could be that "the reality is that dilution
theories are here to stay. 2 11 While this point is duly taken for the present, this
note demonstrates that it is still unclear how long the dilution theory
encompassed in the FTDA can last. At the very least, the dilution doctrine is
an embattled one, and it is imperative that the true cause of its application
difficulties be understood if trademark law is not to be engulfed by its central
goal of misappropriation protection. As Professor Lemley relates by quoting
Ralph Brown, "In an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly advantage is
a very powerful pressure. Unchecked, it would no doubt patent the wheel,
copyright the alphabet, and register the sun and moon as exclusive trademarks. 2 9 We seem to be moving down that road. Unless we are careful, we
may end up in a world in which every thing, every idea, and every word is
owned. And we will all be the poorer for it.
Natalie J. McNeal
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